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Abstract
The role of neuromodulators in the enforcement of cooperation is still not well understood. Here, we provide evidence that
intranasal applied oxytocin, an important hormone for modulating social behavior, enhances the inclination to sanction free-
riders in a social dilemma situation. Contrary to the notion of oxytocin being a pro-social hormone, we found that participants
treated with oxytocin exhibited an amplification of self-reported negative social emotions such as anger towards free-riders,
ultimately resulting in higher magnitude and frequency of punishment of free-riders compared to placebo. Furthermore, we
found initial evidence that oxytocin contributes to the positive effects of a punishment institution by rendering cooperation
preferable in the oxytocin condition for even the most selfish players when punishment was available. Together, these find-
ings imply that the neural circuits underlying altruistic punishment are partly targeted by the oxytonergic system and high-
light the importance of neuromodulators in group cohesion and norm enforcement within social groups.
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Introduction
Oxytocin constitutes one of the most important neuromodula-
tors of social behavior among mammals, including humans.
The evidence on its exact mechanisms of action, however, is
still inconclusive. Several studies have found that the neuro-
peptide oxytocin modulates various behaviors associated with
pro-social behavior (Kosfeld et al., 2005; Israel et al., 2009;
Mikolajczak et al., 2010; Israel et al., 2012), including conflict
resolution (Ditzen et al., 2009), in-group conformity (Stallen
et al., 2012) and both cognitive and emotional empathy ( Domes
et al., 2007; Rodrigues et al., 2009, Guastella et al., 2010; Schulze
et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2013). It is these characteristics
that have led to the common interpretation of oxytocin (hence-
forth OT) as a ‘pro-social’ hormone (MacDonald and MacDonald,
2010, Ebitz et al., 2013). This notion, however, has recently been
questioned due to contradictory findings regarding the effects
of inhaled OT on pro-social preferences. For instance, a recent
systematic review of the oxytocin literature found no evidence
that trust behavior is associated with oxytocin (Nave et al.,
2015). Specifically, these authors found that trust was neither
influenced by inhaled OT, nor by OT plasma levels nor by any
genetic polymorphisms of the OT receptor gene.
Moreover, several recent studies indicate a more contextual
effect of OT on social behavior, since OT has been shown to pro-
mote cooperation within groups but not between them (Dreu
et al., 2010), to enhance a general ethnocentric bias (De Dreu et al.,
2011), to increase dishonesty (Shalvi and De Dreu, 2014; Aydogan
et al., 2017), and to amplify negative social emotions like envy and
schadenfreude evoked by unfair money allocations (Shamay-
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Tsoory et al., 2009). Additionally, inhaled OT increases sensitivity
to the social information of co-players in a social dilemma game
(Declerck et al., 2010, 2013; Mikolajczak et al., 2010; Bartz et al.,
2011;), indicating a more complex role of the neuropeptide in co-
operative behavior (Bartz et al., 2011) than has often previously
been assumed. This more differentiated view is also supported by
animal studies showing that endogenous OT release in the rodent
brain correlates with aggression in mate-guarding behavior (Bales
and Carter, 2003) and with maternal aggression in defending off-
spring against intruders (Bosch, 2005; Bosch and Neumann, 2012).
In this work, we examine the effect of OT on the enforce-
ment of cooperation, since it has been shown that the inclin-
ation to altruistically punish uncooperative behavior with no
egoistic material benefits is a crucial factor for the sustainability
of cooperation (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002;
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004). In building upon studies suggesting
that OT is associated with social emotions like envy and scha-
denfreude in unfair money allocations (Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2009), it is straightforward to assume that inhaled OT may amp-
lify negative emotions (e.g. ‘anger’) toward defectors and there-
fore increase the inclination to enforce the norm of cooperation.
Our primary hypothesis concerns punishment inclination in
a social dilemma game. We therefore hypothesize that inhaled
OT increases the inclination to punish defectors relative to a
placebo in a social dilemma game. To confirm previous findings
on the motivational factors of altruistic punishment
(Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009), we also asked participants to in-
dicate the emotions they experienced before and after the social
dilemma game. As our supporting hypothesis, we predicted an
amplification of negative emotions directed toward defectors
following the violation of a social norm.
Finally, to explore OT’s effects on the efficiency of a punish-
ment institution, we also conducted further analyses examining
the directionality and the effectiveness of punishment—important
features that may determine the sustainability of the social norm.
Materials and methods
Design and participants
To examine the effect of oxytocin on altruistic punishment in a
social dilemma situation, we employed a double-blind, random-
ized, placebo-controlled between-subjects design, in which par-
ticipants intra-nasally self-administered oxytocin (n¼ 72) or a
placebo (n¼ 72) (Syntocinon-Spray, Sigma-Tau; 3 puffs per nos-
tril, each with 4 IU of oxytocin).
A recent meta-analysis by Valstad et al. (2017) confirmed that
inhaled OT constitutes a reliable and harmless way to manipulate
participants’ OT brain levels. However, several recent reviews
identified relatively poor replicability within the OT literature
(Nave et al., 2015; Leng and Ludwig, 2016; Walum et al., 2016),
which partly arises from small sample sizes. To account for these
statistical issues, we recruited 144 male participants—a substan-
tially higher sample size compared to similar studies that, accord-
ing to Walum et al., exhibit a median of 49 individuals.
Participants were between 18 and 33 years old (M6SD, 23.76
3.1 years) and were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). Exclusion
criteria for participation were significant medical or psychiatric
disorders, medication, smoking >15 cigarettes per day and drug or
alcohol abuse. Participants were instructed to abstain from food
for 1 h before the experiment and from alcohol, smoking and caf-
feine for at least 24 h. We also informed all participants during the
recruitment that this experiment’s goal is to study the influence
of oxytocin on economic behavior. The study was approved by the
ethics committee of the Department of Medicine at the University
of Munich and written informed consent was obtained by all par-
ticipants before participation. Analyses were conducted on all 144
participants. The whole experiment took <90 min and was pro-
grammed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All games involved
real monetary stakes (denoted MU for ‘monetary units’ in the fol-
lowing and converted to euro amounts after the experiment).
Each MU earned in the experiment was worth 0.2 e and in the end
of the experiment, all participants received a flat payment of 4 e
as well as their payoff corresponding to their success in the ex-
periment (mean payoff6 s.d., 28.34610.4 e).
Experimental procedure
Participants received neutrally written instructions (see
Instructions in the Supplementary Material), which we read aloud
to make them common knowledge. Decisions were made anonym-
ously on PC screens, and participants were separated into cubicles.
Fifty minutes after the administration of the nasal spray, the
relevant part of the incentivized experiment started. In each ses-
sion, participants were asked to play a one-shot prisoners’ di-
lemma game without a punishment opportunity (henceforth,
PDGX) and with a punishment (sanctioning) opportunity (hence-
forth, PDGS) (Falk et al., 2005). In both treatments PDGX and PDGS,
we made sure, with control questions, that participants under-
stood the payoff structure. To exclude strategic or reputational
concerns, participants were randomly and anonymously as-
signed to groups of three in both treatments. They were informed
that they would not be matched with the same people in each of
the two games or in any other part of the experiment.
In PDGX, participants had to decide simultaneously in groups
of three whether to cooperate or defect. The incentives of PDGX
game are outlined in Table 1. Feedback on the other group mem-
bers’ decisions and on the payoff from PDGX was only given at
the end of the entire experiment in order to avoid learning or
spillover effects. In game PDGX participants were asked to make
the single choice either to cooperate or to defect. As can be seen,
defecting is the payoff-maximizing and hence dominant strategy
for each player, independent of the actions of the other players in
this group. Collectively, however, the highest and thus welfare-
maximizing outcome for the group can only be reached through
cooperation, fulfilling the criteria for a social dilemma.
Then the game PDGS started, which consisted of two stages. In
the first stage, participants played a three-person prisoners’ di-
lemma game equivalent to PDGX. In the second stage, participants
had the opportunity to sanction after being informed about the de-
cisions (cooperate/defect) of their group members in stage 1. They
were informed about this opportunity and about the fact that their
own decisions would be made visible to their group members as
well at the beginning of the treatment, before all decisions were
made. All participants could assign up to a maximum of 10 pun-
ishment points to each of the other two members in their group.
These punishment points were neutrally denoted ‘deduction
points’ in the experimental instructions. Each punishment point
assigned, for which the recipient was deducted 3 MU, cost the pun-
ishing participant 1 MU. The final individual payoff pi for individual
i in the PDGS condition was thus determined by the income from
the first stage, minus three times the sum of received punishment
points, minus the sum of assigned punishment points:
pi ¼ max 0; 20  gi þ 0:6
X
j
gj  3
X
j 6¼i pji
h i

X
j 6¼i pij;
where gi denotes the contribution of subject i, the sum of gj de-
notes the contributions of all three group members to the public
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good, pij represents the amount of deduction points subject i as-
signs to subject j with i 6¼ j, and pji depicts the amount of deduc-
tion points subject i receives by subject j. Since the first stage of
PDGS is equivalent to the PDGX, the choice to contribute is bin-
ary such that g is defined as g 2 0; 20g; 8f i,j. As punishment is
costly, the dominant strategy for selfish decision makers is not
to punish (see Supplementary Material for proof).
To measure their emotional states, participants rated 8 emo-
tions on a 7-point Likert scale, which was conducted twice: first,
immediately after substance administration and, second, im-
mediately after the norm enforcement decision in PDGS.
Participants had to assess the valence of positive and negative
emotions, namely anger, gratitude, guilt, joy, irritation, shame,
surprise and disappointment (Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009).
We also asked participants to rate the perceived fairness of the
other group members’ decision in the first stage in the post-
experimental questionnaire. Participants received an additional
20 MU for the completion of the questionnaires.
Results
To examine whether OT affects the likelihood and magnitude of
punishment directed towards defectors, we ran a Tobit regression
(see Table 2) that controlled for the overall cooperation level
within a group and the directionality of punishment incidents.
Specifically, we regressed the received punishment points of sub-
ject i on his or her decision to negatively or positively deviate
from the other group member j’s decision to cooperate, the group’
s overall level of cooperation, the specific condition (OT vs pla-
cebo), and the interaction between defection and OT treatment.
The first regression in Model 1 reveals that participants receive
deduction points if they negatively deviate, i.e. if they defect
when the other group member j chooses to cooperate, but not if
they positively deviate (i.e. if i cooperates but j does not).
Furthermore, others’ cooperation level has no impact on being
punished. Model 2 extends Model 1 by OT and its interaction with
free-riding behavior, and shows that a negative deviation leads to
a harsher punishment in the OT treatment compared to the pla-
cebo treatment. Again, OT alone has no significant impact on the
amount of punishment points a subject receives. It is rather the
interaction between OT and a negative deviation that leads to a
significantly higher amount of received deduction points.
This result is confirmed by the finding that punishment of
cooperators was virtually absent in both treatment groups
(Figure 1B), without any statistical difference between them
(Mann–Whitney U-test; z¼0.578, P¼ 0.5630, two-sided).
Conversely, we find that defectors in the OT group received an
average of 4.3 punishment points (Figure 1A), which is almost
twice as much as the amount of 2.2 punishment points imposed
on defectors in the placebo group (Mann–Whitney U-test; z¼
2.334, P¼ 0.0196, two-sided). Since one deduction point in this
experiment corresponds to a payoff reduction of 3 MU, a
punished defector would face an average reduction of his payoff
by 12.9 MU (SD¼ 11.39) in the OT condition compared to a reduc-
tion of only 6.6 MU (SD¼ 11.12) in the placebo condition. We
therefore conclude that not only is the inclination to cooperate
enhanced with OT, but the degree of punishment is increased
as well, indicating that OT positively influences the credibility
of using altruistic punishment to enforce cooperation.
Moreover, to examine the effect of OT on punishment fre-
quency, we analyzed the directionality of each punishment in-
cident. Figure 2 displays the direction of all punishment activity
and confirms that the vast majority of punishment incidents go
from cooperators to defectors. This result shows that OT does
not trigger a stronger inclination to punish others, regardless of
the violation of norms: for instance, because of undirected emo-
tional arousal or spiteful motives. Such reasoning would imply
that the punishment behavior of defectors against both, cooper-
ators and other defectors, differs between the OT group and the
placebo group. As can be seen in Figure 2, this is not the case.
Punishment incidents by defectors are not more frequent in the
OT group than in the placebo group (4 out of 44 in the OT group
vs 6 out of 68 in the placebo group; Fisher’s exact-test; P¼ 1,
two-sided). However, there is a difference in the inclination to
punish defectors: In the placebo group, roughly 22% (15 out of
68) of all defectors were punished by cooperators. By contrast,
about 43% (19 out of 44) of defectors in the OT group were pun-
ished, which is significantly higher than the punishment rate in
the placebo group (v2¼ 5.6379; df¼ 1; P¼ 0.018, two-sided). Thus,
we conclude that OT exhibits both, an amplification effect on
the punishment magnitude as well as on the punishment rate
toward defectors.
However, the question still remains whether the motive for
punishment in the OT group is indeed fairness driven or possi-
bly rooted in other motives. Therefore, we analyzed the modu-
lation of negative emotions, triggered by the violation of a social
norm. Specifically, negative emotions related to the violation of
fairness norms, such as anger and disappointment, should be
intensified under the influence of OT and thus should trigger
punishment acts (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). To test this hy-
pothesis, participants were asked to report the intensity of sev-
eral positive and negative emotions on a seven-point Likert
scale immediately after the allocation of their punishment
points and—in order to control for baseline effects—at the be-
ginning of the experiment, subsequent to substance adminis-
tration. As is typical in survey questions on emotions, a list of
related and probably unrelated emotions is presented in order
to avoid experimenter demand effects in elicitation (the focus
here was on anger and disappointment; details on the rating of
other emotions can be found in the Supplementary Material).
Our data shows that participants given OT reported higher lev-
els of anger towards defectors (M¼ 3.07 vs 1.65; SD¼ 2.59 vs 2.57;
Mann–Whitney U-test; z¼2.701, P¼ 0.007, two-sided, con-
trolled for baseline emotions) and higher levels of disappoint-
ment (M¼ 2.95 vs 2.20; SD¼ 2.47 vs 2.23; Mann–Whitney U-test;
Table 1. Payoffs to player i in PDGX and the first stage of PDGS (Falk et al., 2005)
Both other players defect One of the other two players cooperates Both other players cooperate
Player i defects 20 32 44
Player i cooperates 12 24 36
Notes and Sources: Participants were randomly and anonymously assigned to groups of three. They decided simultaneously whether to cooperate or to defect. For ex-
ample, if player i decided to defect whereas both other group members decided to cooperate, player i would earn an income of 44 monetary units (MU) in PDGX and/or
in the first stage of PDGS. If instead player i decided to cooperate, she would earn an income of 36 MU.
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z¼1.800, P¼ 0.0718, two-sided, controlled for baseline emo-
tions). Furthermore, a post-experimental survey question re-
veals that participants in the OT group also perceived the
behavior of defecting group members as significantly less fair
than participants in the placebo group (M¼ 2.93 vs 3.39;
SD¼ 2.09 vs 1.66; Mann–Whitney U-test; z¼ 1.860, P¼ 0.0629,
two-sided). This indicates that participants given OT were emo-
tionally more prone to anger in the face of violated social norms
and suggests a significant impact of OT on neural circuits
encoding emotional responses in social interactions.
Our results finally raise the question whether the punish-
ment magnitude is sufficient to constitute a credible threat
against defective behavior. We therefore computed the ex-
pected payoff given the decisions of all group members in the
first and second stage of the PDGS. Thus, we computed the
average payoffs given each possible decision in the first stage
and then subtracted the average punishment corresponding to
the respective action set with:
Eðpijgi; gjÞ ¼ 20  gi þ 0:6
X
j
gj  E 3
X
j 6¼i pjiðgi; gjÞ
 
In Table 3, the average payoff of subject i is illustrated as a
function of the other group members’ decisions in the oxytocin
and the placebo condition.
Based on the payoff matrices in Table 3 and the frequency of
all players’ actions, we were able to compute the expected
Table 2. Influences on received deduction points
Dependent variable: Received
deduction points of participant i
Ind. Variables Model (1) Model (2)
Cooperation level in group of i 0.266 (1.148) 0.604 (1.293)
Negative deviation of i 10.104*** (1.476) 7.329*** (1.779)
Positive deviation of i 0.285 (1.867) 3.019 (3.230)
OT  Negative deviation of i – 5.707** (2.474)
OT  Positive deviation of i – 4.175 (3.356)
OT – 1.877 (2.146)
Constant 8.308*** (2.289) 6.133** (2.484)
R2 0.100 0.108
Notes and Sources: Note that ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level. Following Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), we performed a Tobit regression with
the number of received punishment points of i as the dependent variable
(N¼288) and clustered standard errors on the participant level. Because the
number of received deduction points ranged from 0 to 20, we used a Tobit re-
gression to account for the censored nature of the dependent variable. The over-
all level of cooperation in i ‘s group is defined as 0 if both other group members
(other than i) defect, 1 if one of them cooperates and 2 if both other group mem-
bers choose to cooperate. The variable negative deviation is 1 if subject i defects
and player j cooperates or 0 otherwise. The variable positive deviation is 1 if sub-
ject i cooperates and player j defects or 0 otherwise. Additionally, in model 2 we
calculated the interaction effect of OT with negative and positive deviation of i.
OT was a dummy variable for the oxytocin group (¼1) and the placebo group
(¼0). An OLS regression provides similar results.
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Fig. 1. Relative frequency of assigned punishment points imposed on defectors (A) and on cooperators (B) as a function of oxytocin. Assigned punishment points are
depicted for the OT group in gray bars and for the placebo group in white bars (n¼144). (A) Punishment points imposed on defectors (M¼ 4.32, SD¼3.79) are signifi-
cantly higher in the OT group than on defectors (M¼2.20, SD¼3.70) in the placebo group (Mann–Whitney U-test; z¼2.334, P¼0.0196, two-sided). (B) Punishment of
cooperators is almost nonexistent; subjects in the OT group (M¼ 0.72, SD¼2.48) and the placebo group (M¼ 0.10, SD¼ 0.45) show non-distinguishable inclinations to
punish cooperators (Mann–Whitney U-test; z¼0.578, P¼0.5630, two-sided).
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payoff of a participant by utilizing the actual distribution of co-
operators and defectors in our sample. Consequently, in the pla-
cebo condition free riding would still result in a higher expected
payoff, since the expected payoff of defecting with 25.39 MU is
higher than the expected payoff of cooperating with 24.46 MU.
Assuming rational expectations, a rational and selfish agent
would therefore prefer to defect in the placebo condition.
Conversely, participants in the OT group are better off cooperat-
ing, since cooperation leads to an expected payoff of 26.74 MU
compared to 26.51 MU in case of defecting. So, for participants
in the OT condition it would be unprofitable to defect in the first
stage, given the expected payoff reduction by other players in
the second stage. Consequently, a rational and selfish decision-
maker would prefer cooperating in the OT but not in the placebo
condition.
To test whether the credible threat of punishment was in-
deed sufficient to achieve the observed increase in cooperation,
we analyzed cooperation behavior separately with and without
the punishment option (see Figure 3A). To analyze both games,
we ran two different Probit regressions to account for (i) positive
effects of a sanctioning mechanism on cooperation, (ii) general
positive effects of OT on cooperation and (iii) an interaction
effect of both variables. The first regression model in Figure 3B
reveals that both punishment (Model 1: bPO¼ 0.359, P< 0.001)
and OT (Model 1: bOT¼ 0.146, P¼ 0.035) have a significantly posi-
tive impact on cooperation. However, to account for possible
interaction effects between both conditions, we ran a second
Probit regression (see Model 2). We find that the punishment
option shows a significant influence on cooperation (Model 2:
bPO¼ 0.335, P< 0.001), whereas the interaction effect fails to
reach significance (bOTxPO¼ 0.053, P¼ 0.602).
Our results suggest that, while cooperation levels are signifi-
cantly higher when punishment of free-riders is possible com-
pared to when it is not—a result that has been established
multiple times in the literature (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000, 2002;
Falk et al., 2005; Chaudhuri, 2011)—OT also shows a positive
effect on cooperation, irrespective of the availability of a sanc-
tioning mechanism. This implies that OT contributes to the effi-
ciency of sanctioning mechanisms predominantly by increasing
the inclination to punish, and indirectly by increasing the likeli-
hood of cooperation.
Discussion
The present study provides initial evidence for the role of OT in
the enforcement of cooperation within small groups. In particu-
lar, we show that inhaled OT significantly increases both the
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Fig. 2. Punishment rate by punished types. The bar C!C represents the proportion of all cooperators punished by other cooperators; analogously, C!D is the propor-
tion of all defectors punished by cooperators; and so on. (A) In the placebo group about 22% (15 out of 68) of all defectors were punished by cooperators, whereas only
6% (4 out 68) were punished by other defectors. Punishment of cooperators (2 out of 76) played only a minor role. (B) In the OT group 43% (19 out of 44) of all defectors
were punished by cooperators. A few defectors punished cooperators (4 out of 100).
Table 3. Payoff of player i in PDGS including all expected punishments of the second stage for the oxytocin (A) and the placebo (B) condition
Both other players One of the other two Both other players
defect players cooperates cooperate
(A) Oxytocin Player i defects 20 (0) 27.5 (8.33) 26.21 (10.15)
Player i cooperates 12 (0) 20.14 (9.69) 36 (0)
(B) Placebo Player i defects 20 (0) 26.46 (9.9) 27.8 (15.5)
Player i cooperates 11.07 (2.2) 24 (0) 36 (0)
Notes and Sources: The corresponding payoffs in the first stage are reduced by the average punishment given the decisions of all group members in the first stage.
Standard deviations are depicted in parentheses. Due to altruistic punishment, playing ‘defect’ is neither in the oxytocin (A) nor in the placebo (B) condition a domin-
ant strategy.
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likelihood and magnitude of punishment of uncooperative be-
havior compared to a placebo, and this increase is accompanied
by an amplification of negative emotional reactions toward de-
fectors. Furthermore, our data support the notion that OT
generally promotes cooperation, irrespective of whether a pun-
ishment option is present. Our results additionally imply that
inhaled OT contributes to the efficiency of sanctioning mechan-
isms directly by increasing the inclination to punish uncoopera-
tive behavior and indirectly by increasing the overall likelihood
of cooperation.
According to previous findings, OT is thought to make norm
adherence more likely through a positive impact on positive
emotions, resulting in an enhanced pro-social attitude (Kosfeld
et al., 2005; Ditzen et al., 2009; Andari et al., 2010; De Dreu et al.,
2010; MacDonald and MacDonald, 2010; Mikolajczak et al., 2010;
Bartz et al., 2011; Israel et al., 2012; Rilling et al., 2012; Declerck
et al., 2013). However, our results suggest a different perspective
on the popularly known ‘moral molecule’, as we show that OT,
rather than having an effect on positive emotions, amplifies
strong negative emotions (i.e. anger) towards non-cooperators
within small groups. This remarkably strong emotional reaction
leads to harsher punishment of uncooperative behavior in the
OT group compared to the placebo group. Consistent with the
finding that emotions, in addition to rational considerations,
work as a proximate mechanism to induce norm-enforcing be-
havior (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; De Quervain et al., 2004; Falk
et al., 2005; Hopfensitz and Reuben, 2009), our data suggests that
OT might have an amplifying effect on social emotions, includ-
ing negative, which ultimately triggers the punishment of
defective behavior and leads to the enforcement of social
norms. This notion is supported by recent findings, indicating
that OT can increase other emotions considered negative, like
envy or gloating (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Reflecting this evi-
dence, more research is needed to indicate whether OT has a
general amplifying effect on emotions in social interactions,
which would align with the observed context-dependent role of
OT in social behavior (Bartz et al., 2011).
Furthermore, our data indicate that, regardless of the avail-
ability of a punishment option, cooperation rates are signifi-
cantly higher following the administration of OT relative to a
placebo. This general increase in the inclination to cooperate
may indirectly contribute to the efficiency of a sanctioning
mechanism. That is, since fewer sanctioning incidents would be
required to achieve the same level of cooperation within a
group, higher cooperation rates would render the total costs of
norm enforcement significantly lower and therefore lead to
higher aggregated payoffs within the group.
This notion is also in line with the actual punishment behav-
ior in our data. Given the punishment behavior in both condi-
tions, participants in the OT condition would always be better off
cooperating, whereas participants in the placebo condition would
still have the opportunity to increase their payoff by free-riding
(as the magnitude of punishment is not sufficiently high to ren-
der cooperation profit-maximizing). Consequently, a selfish agent
with rational expectations would be better off defecting in the
placebo condition and better off cooperating in the OT condition.
We therefore conclude that participants treated with OT
show a higher inclination to deter uncooperative behavior,
Dep. Variable: Choice to cooperate
(defect = 0; cooperate = 1)
Ind. Variables (1) (2) 
Punishment Option .359*** (.045) .335*** (.067) 
Oxytocin .146** (.069) .118 (.088) 
Oxytocin× Punishment Option .053 (.101) 
Pseudo R2 .1103 .1108 
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Fig. 3. (A) Relative frequency of cooperation levels with and without a punishment option in the OT (grey bars) and placebo (white bars) groups (n¼144). (B) The choice
to cooperate is the dependent variable in a Probit regression with clustered standard errors on the participant level. Coefficients represent marginal effects on the prob-
ability to cooperate. Note that ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
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which transforms the cooperation incentives from a classical
prisoner’s dilemma into a coordination game (Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000, 2002; Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2004). In a similar vein, Zak et al. (2007) found a
positive effect of inhaled OT on monetary transfers in an ulti-
matum game, but not in a dictator game. The authors argue
that this effect is rooted in the anticipation of putative punish-
ment (through rejections of low offers)—a risk uniquely present
in the ultimatum game. Given such beliefs, a rational decision-
maker might therefore increase his or her expected payoff by
reducing the risk of a rejected offer.
Some evidence also suggests that inhaled OT improves the
accuracy of first order beliefs by enhancing one’s ability to ‘put
oneself emotionally in the shoes of another person’ (Domes
et al., 2007; Hollander et al., 2007; Averbeck, 2010; Guastella et al.,
2010; Pedersen et al., 2011; Schulze et al., 2011; Shamay-Tsoory
et al., 2013). Here, we indirectly explored this by examining
whether OT has an effect on the ability to form first order beliefs
about other participants’ inclination to cooperate or punish. Our
data suggests no interaction effect between inhaled OT and the
presence of a punishment option, which would be expected if
inhaled OT increased the accuracy of first order beliefs.
Nevertheless, more research is required to examine potential
positive effects of OT on perspective taking in strategic settings.
Moreover, in this experiment we observe that the social norm
of cooperation, which ties the group together, is defended aggres-
sively in the prisoners’ dilemma game against free-riders within
the group. In a similar fashion, OT has been shown to stimulate
defensive aggression (De Dreu et al., 2010) against competing out-
groups. Together, these results paint a broader picture, in which
OT triggers aggressive behavior to protect the in-group’s welfare,
either against threats from outside or from within. This is also
congruent with animal studies showing OT’s role in triggering
maternal aggression toward intruders or toward potential dan-
gers to offspring (Bosch, 2005; Bosch and Neumann, 2012). The in-
group (i.e. mother and children) is aggressively defended against
potential threats to the group’s well-being. Here, we show initial
evidence in humans that OT can trigger or enhance anger, and
subsequently result in harsher punishment of others. In our case,
however, the threat to the group’s well-being is not external; it
arises from the actions of free-riders within the group itself.
Whether the threat is internal or external, it is straightforward to
assume that the oxytonergic system plays a crucial role in the
modulation of behavior with the purpose to ultimately increase a
social group’s welfare, which is likely rooted in the ultimate goal
to enhance the group’s chances of survival. This notion is also
supported by studies showing that OT enhances in-group con-
formity (Stallen et al., 2012), in-group favoritism (De Dreu et al.,
2010, 2011) and group-serving dishonesty (Shalvi and De Dreu,
2014), all of which also serves group welfare.
Our results provide evidence for a deeper understanding of
the oxytonergic system and give insights into its effects on co-
operative behavior. Furthermore, our results call for more work
on the connection of OT, social norms and norm-enforcement be-
havior, with the ultimate goal to understand the general underly-
ing mechanism that leads to the various described effects of OT
and to utilize this knowledge in potential clinical treatments of
disorders associated to social behavior or norm adherence.
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